



D R A F T
5 May 1958

COMMENTS ON THE REPORT OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
CONCERNING THE SENIOR RESEARCH STAFF
ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

1. SRS from its inception has recognized that it was part of a bold and imaginative design to broaden and deepen the intellectual base of policy in countering International Communism, the greatest threat to our national security. As such, it conceived itself as being an experimental vessel, launched with hopes and misgivings in the riptides of government. Like any serious trial project, it has constantly sought to appraise itself dispassionately and to consider the alternatives to its continued existence. In the course of two and a half years of intense self-criticism, it has come to certain conclusions which differ significantly from the findings and recommendations of the Inspector General. In sum, SRS believes that the original conception from which it was created was sound, but that certain changes in its position within the Agency would be advisable. These are presented below in the form of specific recommendations, after a comment on the findings of the Inspector General.

2. We believe that the Inspector General's account of the origin of SRS is correct, although it may not indicate sufficiently the complex

SECRET

25X1A9a nature of the survey conducted by [REDACTED] in 1954-55, nor the full scale of alternatives which were canvassed at that time. This is a not unimportant omission, in that it passes over the deliberation with which SRS was established and the weight in the intelligence community which it was intended to have. Furthermore, within the horizon of ideas surveyed at that time, lies, in our opinion, the correct resolution of the problems which the Inspector General's report has analyzed.

3. The report might also have devoted more consideration to the fact that [REDACTED] attempted to provide a three-part mechanism for conducting research on International Communism, defining and strengthening the roles of CI/ICD and of OIR in the field of International Communism, and creating a new instrument, SRS, to conduct a type of research which neither of the other two was intended to do. This conception, which was noted officially by the IAC (IAC-D-99, August 1955) clearly implied cooperation and interaction of the three elements while maintaining separateness of function. In a sense, a sort of arch was created which could not continue to stand if one of its three structural elements was removed. The recommendations of the Inspector General that the SRS function be removed from the Agency and from the government thus, not only negates the original conception,

SECRET

but raises the question how the two expanded Communist research elements of DD/P and OIR would deal with that particular area - the speculative - which had been assigned to SRS.

4. Indeed, it seems to us that the principal criticism of the IG report is its failure to give due weight to this speculative function.

That the speculative study of Communism was considered to be a serious gap in governmental research on International Communism

25X1A9a is made clear in both the original memorandum of [REDACTED] and in IAC-D-99. SRS has worked consistently under the stipulation that it was to view the world situation of Communism so far as possible "through Kremlin eyes, " and to develop from that insight, suggestions for "countering Communism." To this task it has brought a specialized form of imagination and discipline which, we believe, could not be readily replaced if its staff were dispersed.

5. That the speculative function of SRS involves comment on US policy was recognized in the language of IAC-D-99. The Inspector General believes that this is not an appropriate function for an intelligence agency to exercise, and this relatively narrow interpretation of the intelligence function has its defenders. Nevertheless, de facto, and to some extent de jure, CIA does play a role in the formation and

SECRET

execution of national policy, and so long as this remains the case, we believe that it should have an element which concerns itself with speculation on such matters as the Director of Central Intelligence includes within his purview as member of the Operations Coordination Board, Chief of the Intelligence Community, and Advisor of the National Security Council. It should be noted that this aspect of SRS production has been rigidly confined to the channel of the Deputy Director for Intelligence who has been at liberty to indicate any transgressions of the bounds within which the Staff was intended to operate. If it should be deemed that this entire function is inappropriate, it could be eliminated and still leave intact the broad range of intelligence speculation which was also assigned to SRS and which has been the subject of the bulk of its study and of its production disseminated outside the Agency. It is my personal opinion that something valuable would be lost by such a decision, but it could be carried out without doing violence to the conception of the Staff.

6. The Inspector General implies that SRS has not been "sufficiently close to the policy level of the Government in order to be as effective as originally envisaged" (p. 54, para. 3). While this may be partly true, it is hardly the fault of SRS, since from the beginning certain

SECRET

tacit inhibitions were laid upon the extension of its contacts with higher levels of the government. Actually, SRS has maintained and developed a considerable number of fruitful liaison relations with the NSC staff, the OCB, the State Department and higher echelons of Defense and the military services, not to mention

25X1C8a

25X1C8a

25X1C8a

[REDACTED] These could be expanded readily, if the inhibitions, referred to above, were relaxed.

7. The actual production of SRS has, we believe, been more distinctive and fruitful than the Inspector General's report seems to imply. It is only partially correct to say that our work has been primarily "self-generated." A substantial proportion has been responsive to direct requests for assistance, notably from the IO Division and the [REDACTED] and has been received with appreciation. We have also contributed directly to outside agencies, especially OCB and USIA (notably SRS-5, International Communism and Youth: The Challenge of the 1957 Moscow Festival, which was transmitted to SEATO in advance of Agency publication and to US Embassy, Moscow, and numerous foreign governments). We have on occasion commented on drafts of the Director and of ONE, and have had numerous oral

25X1A8a

SECRET

discussions with desk officers of the DD/P branches bearing on their operational problems. In other words, while "self-generation" is and probably should be the major source of SRS activity, it is not the only one. * The Staff has become an integral part of the Agency and the intelligence community, and through this position has made a substantial contribution to other elements of the government. With the organizational broadening of base, recommended below, its seminal influence can be greatly extended in the future.

8. The Inspector General refers to the "suspicion and hostility" with which SRS has been viewed since its inception (para. f. (1)(b) 1., p. 54). Surely this is no fault of SRS, and, in any case, ^{we} /have done our best to remove all grounds of conflict which might arise from unavoidable overlap, professional jealousy, or sheer misunderstanding. We feel that we have made great progress in gaining acceptance, especially at the working level, and that many if not most thoughtful officers concerned with International Communism, now regard SRS as an indispensable element in that field.

* SRS has experimented in announcing its research program to the Intelligence Community (see "Production for the Senior Research Staff on International Communism 1 July 1956-30 June 1957)". This document elicited no particular response, and since, inevitably, many changes were necessary, it has seemed best not to repeat the experiment. We have, however, kept OIR and ICD informed as to our projects, and to some extent this has been reciprocated.

SECRET

SECRET

9. The report presents, we believe, a somewhat misleading impression of the relation of SRS production to that of other Agency elements, especially CI/ICD. It is not correct to imply that our disseminated works have frequently presented views conflicting with other Agency publications. Each major SRS study bears a clear caveat, stressing its speculative approach and the informal nature of the coordination to which it has been subjected. If this is not sufficient to differentiate SRS studies, say from NIEs or CI/ICD publications, this caveat could be made fuller and more explicit. We do not believe, as matters now stand, that our works are misunderstood as representing the official Agency position.

10. In spite of the fact that SRS judgments are independent and not subject to compulsory coordination, they have in fact been largely agreed to by competent elements within and outside the Agency. The two exceptions noted in the IG report, (para. d.(3), p. 50), rather than being evidence of an impermissible conflict, are in fact indicative of valid difference of opinion on an important subject, i.e. the role of constructive political as opposed to repressive police measures in combatting Communism. The paper in question, SRS-4, Legal vs. Illegal Status: Some Considerations Relevant to Banning a Communist Party, was a balanced evaluation of the two approaches to

this task, and was recognized as such by many of its readers.

The fact that CI/ICD was opposed to its publication was communicated to DD/I, who nevertheless approved its issuance. It is true that SRS judgment with respect to the Nenni Socialists was different from that of the CI Staff, but it is not true, as stated in the report, that our view was disseminated outside, or even within the Agency. Rather, at the instigation of DDP/PP, a serious debate was conducted in which it became apparent that the judgment not only of SRS but of the majority of intelligence analysts (ONE, OCI and OIR)

25X1A8a

was opposed to that of CI/ICD and the [REDACTED] of DDP. The issue was laid before the Director, who, as far as we are aware, has not indicated that the SRS contribution to this important debate was out of order. Apart from these two issues, there has been general harmony of views between SRS and CI/ICD; we have reviewed each other's papers in draft, and SRS has made many suggestions to CI/ICD which have been received with expressions of appreciation.

11. The comparison between SRS and CI/ICD production (para. d., p. 49) may be somewhat misleading. The purely statistical confrontation, considering the relative sizes of the two elements, is not unfavorable to SRS. The listing of titles has been somewhat arbitrary in

SECRET

selection, and implies a degree of overlap between the two which in fact does not exist. The IG report notes a difference of content and approach between the two products but does not specify its nature. In our opinion the difference is profound, reflecting the quite diverse functions of the two staffs.* CI/ICD production is properly weighted in support of DDP operations; it is usually either narrative-descriptive or in the nature of detailed factual compilation. On occasion, indeed, CI/ICD has ventured into the speculative field, sometimes quite successfully, and ^{SRS} has made constructive comments on them. Nevertheless, a problem does exist in the incursion of CI/ICD into a field which is properly that of DDI in general, not merely of SRS. This problem has been noted by the DDI himself. The recommendation given below is designed, inter alia, to resolve

*A representative example of the complementary functions of CI/ICD and SRS is in the treatment of the Moscow Youth Festival. SRS-5 International Communism and Youth: The Challenge of the 1957 Moscow Festival was a basic study of the then pending Festival designed to contribute to policy and intelligence judgment at the top level of government. In January 1958 CI/ICD published "Participation in World Youth Festivals," an extensive compilation of statistical data. This.



25X1X4

SECRET

this matter by providing a legitimate charter outlet for the considerable residue of speculative thought which inevitably has accumulated in a large group of specialists doing research in support of operations. It might be noted that this problem is not confined to CI/ICD but arises in other elements of DDP,

25X1A8a notably SR Division, RQM and [REDACTED]

12. Perhaps the most disappointing feature of the IG report is its apparent failure to evaluate the production of SRS in terms of originality, depth, intellectual distinction, and stimulation of thought. Such an evaluation is indeed difficult to formulate, whether on the basis of a reading of the material or a sampling of reactions by customers. SRS has constantly attempted to obtain such reactions, and, while they have not been numerous, at least in written form, they have been substantial and positive. Moreover, it is possible to judge indirectly from the incorporation of SRS themes and proposals into the thought and action of groups and individuals associated with the action programs and policy functions of the government. From this we feel justified in concluding that we have made a number of contributions on the most important subjects of national security which have been consistent, clear and marked by unusual foresight. It is not the purpose of this paper to illustrate this claim, but SRS

SECRET

is prepared to list a number of major contributions, any one of which would be sufficient to justify its existence.

13. Turning to the recommendations of the Inspector General, SRS contends that they do not follow as a necessary conclusion from the findings. In effect what is said is that more speculative research on International Communism is desirable, but that it should not be done within the government. It is not entirely clear to us whether this conclusion is derived solely from intrinsic considerations, or is in part influenced by budgetary concern. It would hardly seem that the transfer of this type of work from an Agency office to an outside organization supported by the Agency would constitute an economy, nor make the Agency's budget more defensible. If economy is the objective, it would seem possible to achieve this more rationally by tidying the structure of research within the Agency through internal consolidation and concentration of effort. SRS would have a number of proposals to make on this subject.

25X1A5a1 14. It may be debated whether an outside organization such as [REDACTED] is capable of exercising greater influence on the policy process than a strategically placed element of government itself. It is true that, on occasion, a non-governmental voice, a prominent columnist or correspondent or a distinguished scholar, may elicit

a more positive reaction in Washington than a constituted intelligence agency. Nevertheless, our experience suggests that the research papers of scholarly institutions are - unfortunately - all too often neglected, except perhaps by individual analysts, and do not have the weight of properly staffed official papers.

15. Moreover, the advantages enjoyed by governmental research appear to us to be decisive in the type of work with which SRS is charged. There is no substitute for the full "take" of cables, dispatches and reports which even in a cleared group ~~such as GENIS~~ are never fully and promptly available. Still less is there a substitute for the innumerable daily contacts with officials who must deal with the problems of combatting Communism on the level of action responsibility. The advantage of detachment and freedom from pressure, which is sometimes imputed to non-governmental scholarship, is real, but perhaps less inspiring than frequently supposed. In any case, SRS has found from its own experience that it is possible to achieve detachment and time for reflection within the government framework, and that the daily pressures of production need not weigh too heavily on a group who are able and determined to resist them and whose long-range purview is clearly

recognized and protected. SRS has also found that it can move with ease and flexibility in the highest academic circles, here and abroad, enjoying a degree of prestige and access which would scarcely be achievable if it were simply one of a number of scholarly groups in the field. This valuable asset, which is fully reflected in our work, would be lost if SRS were removed from Washington.

16. Another negative, though secondary factor in weighing the Inspector General's recommendation, is the personal career position of the staff members who might be affected by a transfer to

25X1A5a1

While all of them accept the career obligation to go where their services are most needed, they do not welcome the prospect presented by the IG's recommendation. They are all dedicated to government service, and feel that the 10 to 15 years' experience which most of them have acquired in intelligence can best be utilized in Washington or abroad. In the event SRS were abolished, they would hope that their records would make it possible for them to get suitable positions elsewhere in the Agency.

17. Since, as indicated above, we do not regard the IG's recommendations as the best solution to the problems posed, it behooves us to offer some constructive alternative. This has been a continuing

SECRET

preoccupation of SRS. In a sense the concern with alternative solutions may be said even to have antedated the creation of the Staff, and the proposal which we make was first elaborated by

25X1A9a

██████████ in 1955.

18. In essence the recommendation is similar to but less sweeping than the conception of Chief, CI/DDP set forth on page 48 of the Inspector General's report. This matter was discussed in 1956 between Chief, CI Staff, and Chief, SRS, and has been ripened subsequently in our deliberations. It was not presented earlier, so as not to prejudice the Inspector General's findings, nor to raise internal organizational stirrings prematurely.

19. Our proposal is to unite SRS and the bulk of CI/ICD in a single body, established as an office under an Assistant Director reporting to the Director of Central Intelligence. It is suggested that this office be regarded as serving the interests of the entire Community, of which the Director of Central Intelligence is head. To accomplish this, there should be a strong Committee of the IAC on International Communism. The present Committee, which confines itself largely to the coordination of requirements, could serve as the matrix for a more substantial body, which should be chaired by the Assistant Director for International Communism, rather than,

as at present, by an OIR Deputy. The individual IAC components would be invited to assign analysts to the staff.

20. One of the chief advantages of this proposal is that it would remove the present jurisdictional ambiguities of the SRS position with respect to access to DDP, and the CI/ICD incursions into fields assigned to DDI. DDP would retain such facilities as it required for operational support, but would derive all its research matter from the Office of International Communism. To the latter could be added a number of scattered research elements now working in closely related fields, notably, the [REDACTED] Project, parts of the [REDACTED] Propaganda Analysis Branch, and small groups or individuals from SR Division and the [REDACTED] staff. It might also be desirable to transfer from ORR and OSI a few individuals who would be qualified to do research in the long-range economic, scientific and technical aspects of the Communist threat.

21. This paper does not attempt to work out the details of such a reorganization, but we are ready to produce a specific plan if the proposal is deemed worthy of further investigation. We believe that the proposed office should be organized on both geographic and functional lines, somewhat comparable to the present CI staff. The Division or branch chiefs would be responsible for directing the

~~SECRET~~

research of their components, and would also constitute a body, somewhat like the Estimates Group of OIR, which would continue the speculative work of SRS. While this office would be independent of DDP and DDI it would work with them in closest collaboration and would help support their many and varied missions.

22. Essential to the success of this Office would be careful staffing with the best available minds. This should include a number of experienced operations officers on two-year rotational tours. Every effort should be made to simplify the organizational structure of the Office and to eliminate distracting influences and impacts. It should be self-administering, since it is difficult to reconcile administrative subordination to one of the other offices with the necessary independence of judgment. In our opinion, if International Communist specialists were contributed from the various units of the Agency mentioned above, the whole could be consolidated with a substantial saving of manpower.

23. This is a bold suggestion, departing from conventional organizational notions and challenging established jurisdictions. It has, however, the significant support of one of the most experienced officials of the Agency in this field, Chief/CI. We believe that it is also a natural outgrowth of the scheme projected by Mr. ████████,

25X1A9a


~~SECRET~~

and one which, with support from the Director and his Deputies, would strengthen the Agency in its central mission.

24. Finally, it should be noted that this proposal does not imply that [REDACTED] should not be strengthened in the field of International Communism. This may well be desirable, but in our opinion it is not the best solution to the problem of improving the International Communist program of the Government.

25X1A5a1

25X1A9a



1 encl.